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Welfare Reform

Lessons from
New England

Richard M. Francis

Thomas

J.

Anton

This article examines state welfare policy choices following the passage of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. Using data

from national studies and an

intensive study of policymaking in

New

England,

the authors demonstrate that states have acted independently rather than uni-

formly

in

response to devolution. Because states did not respond as predicted,

and for reasons

that were not anticipated, scholars must develop

new ap-

understanding state policymaking. This study argues that accounting for state policy choices requires an understanding of the context of
policymaking. Conventional analyses of welfare reform have ignored the insti-

proaches

to

tutional structures through which policy

is

formulated and thus miss the most

important determinant of choices: the actions of administrative officials. The
lesson of welfare reform in New England is clear: administration matters.

It

is

three years since President Bill Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and

Work Opportunity

Reconciliation Act into Law. While

clearly is too early to

it

attempt definitive conclusions about the significance of that action,

it is

also clear

months are beginning to reveal interesting
implement welfare reform. Those patterns are impor-

that the experiences of the past thirty-six

patterns of behavior as states
tant not only

because they reveal the scope and direction of

also because they challenge

and quality of

state

much

government

of the conventional

actions. In this study,

state welfare policy

wisdom about

we

but

the sources

use the experiences of the

New

England states to offer some preliminary observations about the content of
state policymaking in reforming welfare. We also use these experiences to examine
the conventional wisdom developed by social scientists to think about this most
six

recent effort to reform

American welfare

about welfare policymaking

For those

who may

is

as

much

policy.

in

We

argue that the

way we

need of "reform" as the policy

think

itself.

think that the experience of only six of the fifty states

slender a reed for offering general conclusions of any kind,

we

is

too

suggest a different

view, namely, that these states offer important analytic advantages for understanding emerging patterns of action.

The

first is diversity:

New

England includes large
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and small

form

states, rich

efforts will

interest

states,

urban and rural

and states whose

states,

re-

very liberal. Since our

to

in identifying potential patterns rather than established patterns, diversity

is

among

and poor

be shown to range from very restrictive

these six states

analytically useful. Second, for

is

diversity,

all its

New

En-

gland remains an identifiable region with permeable state borders that should shed

some light on issues such as the extent to which state policymakers are constrained
by the decisions made by other states. Finally, we make liberal use of results beginning to appear from studies with a national focus. Comparing observations of six
states with data available from numerous other states enables us to offer insights
enriched by both regional and national studies.

What New England

We

States

Are Doing

begin with two obvious but often unappreciated points. The

England

August 1996 did not

national welfare reform in

New

first is that

New

the

have been pursuing welfare reform for many years. Enactment of

states

England,

it

reform

initiate or force

efforts in

merely rearranged the structural incentives through which reform

would be pursued. Even

if

we

ignore the well-documented effort by Massachusetts

welfare system in the 1980s,

remains true

Vermont

to reform

its

reform

1991 and that the other states in the region became active in the early

1990s

in

as well.

Each

1

it

has had to accommodate

state

its

that

programs

be sure, but the federal-state relationship here

legislation, to

is

to the

initiated its

new

national

accommodation, not

dictation.

The second point

is

that

to

new

craft policies
ties.

This

adopted

in other states

through each

filtered

its

—

New

far

citizens,

None

states

has followed

own

its

of the states has attempted

and none has attempted

to simply

neighbors. Instead, each of the states has attempted to

designed to deal with

not to say that

is

its

England

welfare policies.

impose some model solution on

copy proposals adopted by

New

each of the six

independent path in shaping

its

own

England

from

it.

peculiar

state

mix of problems and opportuni-

policymakers have ignored policies

But information from other

state's traditions, culture,

and

states has

been

institutional structure before

being adopted, dropped, or modified. Put another way, each state has acted as a
separate political entity, with independent authority, free to shape welfare policies
to

meet

its

own

One way

political

and economic imperatives.

to appreciate the variety of choices

state plans filed

made

is to

examine the content of

with the national government as a condition of receiving the

new

Needy Families (TANF) block grant. Based on information provided by the American Public Welfare Association in its September
1997 State -by -State Welfare Reform Policy Decisions, Table 1 provides a rank order-

federal

Temporary Assistance

to

ing of the fifty states according to the relative generosity of their reform policies.

The ranking

is

based on thirteen

For each policy,
option

—

states

common

policy options found in state

were awarded one point

for example, not having a

and penalized one point

if

TANF

they chose the

more

restrictive policy as

were weighted equally

for each state that in principle could range

to

66

2

denying

—

TANF

provide a composite score

from a high of plus 13

13.

plans.

more generous

time limit shorter than sixty months

they chose such

to legal noncitizens. All options

if

TANF

to

a low of minus

Table

1

Ranking of State

State

Score

+ 11
+ 10
+9
+8
+8
+7
+7
+7
+7
+6
+6
+6
+5
+5
+5
+5
+5
+5
+5
+4
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3

Kansas

+3
+3
+3

Island

Maine
Colorado

Vermont
Utah
Texas
Ohio

Oregon
Iowa
South Carolina
Kentucky
Alaska

West

Plans

Score

State

Rhode

TANF

Virginia

Washington

Oklahoma
Missouri

Hawaii
Delaware
Arizona
New Jersey
Pennsylvania

New York
New Hampshire
Montana
Michigan

Indiana

Arkansas

~2

North Carolina
Nebraska
Georgia

+2
+2
+1
+1
+1

Tennessee
New Mexico

Nevada

+1
+

Mississippi

Minnesota

1

+1
+1
+1

Virginia

Connecticut

Alabama
Wisconsin
Maryland

Wyoming

-1
-1
-1

Virginia

South Dakota

-1
-1

Idaho
Florida

Illinois

-2
-2
-3

Massachusetts

-5

North Dakota
California

Source: American Public Welfare Association, State-by-State Welfare Reform
Policy Decisions, September 1997, processed.

The range of policy choices revealed

Table

in

underscores the difficulty of

1

generalizing about state welfare reform decisions.

Some

states

have preserved gen-

erous policies, the majority have balanced liberal and restrictive provisions, and

about one

fifth

of the states have chosen to adopt more restrictive eligibility require-

ments. Clearly, states have not followed any single pattern. Instead, as the American
Public Welfare Association itself concludes, the "underlying theme that emerges
is

that states are taking a

wide variety of approaches

and services for [TANF] families

Nowhere
reveals,

Rhode

is

New

Island

—

state

to the

.

.

[and] the

mix of

in

New

England. As Table

restrictive

— Massachusetts —

.

.

—

policies in the country,

affirming our earlier observation about the independence of state actions.

among

1

welfare reform plans range from the most generous

most

.

assistance

quite diverse." 3

more pronounced than

that diversity

England

is

.

Even

the remaining four states, there is considerable variation in the types of poli-

cies chosen. In only

two issue

ing to drug-test applicants, did

areas, providing
all six states

TANF

to legal noncitizens

report taking the

same

and refus-

action. Like the

nation as a whole, the region includes states that represent the entire spectrum of

— Rhode
Maine, Vermont; moderate —
— Connecticut and Massachusetts.

possible policy choices: generous

New

Hampshire; and restrictive

Island,

These outcomes demonstrate that states choose quite different policies, even
where they border one another. This point is particularly important in

instances

England, where migration to one of

many

states is facilitated

67

by

their proximity.

in

New
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Indeed, considering that generous

Rhode

Island

is

sandwiched between

restrictive

Massachusetts on the east and restrictive Connecticut on the west, the difference in
scores for these neighboring states
state

formulated their

own

is

instructive. Clearly, decision

makers

in

each

policy goals, regardless of what their neighbors were

doing.

The sheer

New

variety of policies adopted

England

is

would race

gest that states
esis that

under devolution

England. 4 This point
is

"all states will

is

of welfare to

1

considered.

doubt on theories which sug-

casts

be engaged
its

in

a race for the bottom, each

neighbors" has not happened in

The order

in

New

as well as the quality

which state reform plans were enacted was
Hampshire, Maine, and Rhode Island. As

New

these states scored +8, -5, +1, +3, +10, and +11, respectively, in

illustrates,

the ranking,

it

emphasized even more when the timing

Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Table

states across the country as well as in

undercut each other when setting benefits. The hypoth-

to

state trying to shift the cost

of state plans

by

an important discovery, since

which indicates

no relationship between the date of submisits provisions. To the extent that there is
one of increasing generosity over time. Maine and Rhode Island,
that there is

sion of a state plan and the generosity of

any pattern,

it is

two most generous states in the country, submitted plans at least one month after
other states had made their intentions known. The most telling example is Rhode
Island, which adopted its policies a full two years after Massachusetts experimented
with the waiver that would become its state plan.
the

The data shown
to the

bottom,

in Table

make

1

some imagined race

clear that variety, rather than

the dominant characteristic of state policy choice.

is

How

can

we

explain such diverse policy outcomes?

Explaining Variety:

Long before

Do

5

Even under old

eligibility

Work?

the passage of the Personal Responsibility and

onciliation Act, studies
cies.

Existing Theories

Work Opportunity Rec-

had found substantial differences among

AFDC

state welfare poli-

guidelines, states retained limited authority to determine

requirements and benefit levels. Scholars have used several variables to

explain policy variation, including state fiscal condition, tax capacity, population

demographics, partisanship, and legislative professionalism. 6 Though there are
ferences

among

these studies, the general principle

is

dif-

straightforward: increases in

the values of these variables lead to increases in welfare generosity. For example,
states

with favorable economic conditions, higher tax capacities, and more wealthy

populations are likely to have

more

liberal policies. If a state legislature has a

percentage of Democrats and a greater degree of professionalism,
likely to

be more

its

higher

policies are

liberal.

New

England cases, however, these political-economic determiNeedy Families provisions. For example, Massachusetts, with the region's best growth rate, a
high tax capacity, high per capita income, Democratic control of the legislature, and
high legislative professionalism, should have adopted a generous state plan. Other
examples are less clear cut, but none of the fiscal or political variables typically
Set against the

nants of policy prove to be poor predictors of Temporary Assistance to

used to explain state policies adequately accounts for the direction of welfare policies in the six states.

Consider the presumptive impact of economic conditions on policy. Data avail-

68

able for onc-ycar growth rates beginning the
the

state's

first fiscal

quarter of 1996 and ending

quarter of 1997 provide a context for examining the impact of a

first fiscal

economy on

its

welfare policy. This time frame encompasses the period be-

fore states negotiated plans through several months after implementation.

combined data on employment, personal income, and population
dex

that ranks the states

national growth rate

to

We

according to the growth of their economies. In Table

is set at

zero.

Each

performance

state's index reflects its

have

develop an

in-

2, the

rela-

tive to the national average.

Massachusetts, which has the highest economic growth
tive policy.
states,

Rhode

Island and Vermont, both

among

the

rate,

most

has the most restric-

fiscally

have adopted generous welfare programs. Despite having

mentum

than

New

Hampshire, Maine has a

far

more generous

less

plan.

challenged

economic mo-

Other economic

indicators bolster these findings. Connecticut and Massachusetts have the highest
tax capacities in the region (see Table 3), but the most restrictive plans.

Rhode

Is-

land and Maine have the lowest tax capacities but the most generous welfare plans.

Table 2

Index of State

Momentum, 1996-1997

State

Percentage

Massachusetts
New Hampshire
United States
Maine
Connecticut

0.50
0.39
0.00
-0.10
-0.30

Rhode

-0.77

Island

Vermont

-0.88

Source: State Policy Research,

A

similar relationship occurs

1996, Connecticut ranked

ranked

third.

Vermont

The

Inc.,

State Policy Reports, September 1997.

between income

first in

levels

and

state policy choices. In

the country in per capita income; Massachusetts

three states with the

most generous provisions, Rhode Island

(18),

and Maine (36), all had per capita incomes at or below the national
Instead of adopting generous plans, high-income states were the most

(29),

average. 7

restrictive.

Low-income

states

were

far less willing to

Standard political indicators do no better

at

choose

restrictive policies.

explaining welfare policies in the

Table 3

Tax Capacity, Percentage of National Average, 1994
State

Percentage

Connecticut

135.7

New

Hampshire
Massachusetts
United States

113.1

112.5
100.0

Vermont
Rhode Island
Maine
Source:

95.0
93.5
88.7

State Policy Research, Inc., State Policy Reports, January 1998.
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New

England

example, provides

states. Partisanship, for

composition of the six state legislatures in 1996, when
is

Rhode

reported in Table 4 below.

crats, 83 percent, adopted the

Democratic majorities
states

in

most

help.

little

TANF

The

partisan

plans were developed,

Island, with the highest percentage of
liberal plan.

both houses of

Demo-

Yet Massachusetts also had large

its legislature.

To complicate matters, both
states were al-

had Republican governors. From a partisan perspective, both

most exactly

alike.

Partisan explanations also fail to account for other states within the region. Al-

though

New

Hampshire had the lowest percentage of Democratic

legislators, its state

plan was more generous than those produced in Massachusetts and Connecticut.

The

percentage of Republican legislators was higher in Maine and Vermont than in Con-

when TANF plans were formulated,

necticut

more gener-

yet these states produced

ous plans.
Table 4
Partisan Composition of State Legislatures,

1996
Percentage
of

State

Rhode

Island

Democrats

Republicans

Democrats

124

26
43
77
79
93
300

83
78
59
55
49

Massachusetts

151

Connecticut

110
98

Vermont
Maine

91

New Hampshire

116

39

Source: Council of State Governments, The Book of the States: 1996-97.

Since four of the six states had Republican governors
submitted,
less

it is

it is

difficult to assess the

important to

remember

when TANF

plans were

impact of gubernatorial partisanship. Neverthe-

that the first state to

submit

its

waiver request, Ver-

mont, was led by a Democratic governor. States that had Republican governors pro-

duced policies which ranged from generous to
party controlled the legislature. This

only state that did not have divided control.
is

outstanding, given

restrictive,

independently of which

especially noteworthy in

is

New

Hampshire, the

As one New Hampshire legislator noted, "Our plan

how conservative New Hampshire is supposed to be."

Finally, legislative professionalism is believed to

have a positive impact on the

generosity of state welfare policy. 8 But legislative politics in Maine, Vermont, and

Rhode Island are not as highly professional as in Massachusetts and Connecticut.
Even New Hampshire, with its highly amateur style of politics, produced a plan far
more generous than those of most other states. Contrary to expectations, states with
less professional politics

Why
The

produced more generous plans

Explanations Fail: Models and Methods

economic and political indicators to illuminate welfare
England may reflect nothing more than the difficulty of attempting to

failure of conventional

reform in

New

derive general conclusions from a very small
there

in the region.

is

another serious problem, which

is

number of

cases. In our view, however,

the absence of intervening institutions in

70

popular explanations of policy outcomes. In using measurements of economic or
political conditions to explain policy, the

direct relationship

assumption seems to be

that there

between the measured condition and policy. Public

a

nothing more than the aggregate conditions measured

this conceptualization, reflect

by numerical indicators. Wealthy people have more money

to spend, thus

have more generous welfare plans, and vice versa.

states are likely to

is

policies, in

If

wealthy

Democrats

dominated by Democrats will
plans and legislatures dominated by Republicans will produce re-

are liberal and Republicans conservative, legislatures

produce

liberal

In this view, understanding policy is little

strictive plans.

more

than an exercise in

demographics.
This representation

much

tures

is

something of a caricature,

to

be sure, but we believe

it

cap-

of the popular thinking about welfare reform and helps to account for the

popularity of the "race to the bottom" hypothesis.

Those who have predicted such a

race typically have believed that all states are dominated by business interests,

which are uniform
hence

in their desire for less

all states will

government spending and lower

taxes;

be driven to lower their welfare benefits. So long as a uniform

assumed rather than examined, and so long as the entities reunexamined, this model has an appealing logic.
Business seeks the lowest-cost bottom line and, seeking to accommodate business

business interest

is

ferred to as states remain equally

interests, states

respond by cutting benefits as they race to the bottom. In some un-

specified and unanalyzed way, a uniform business interest

is

directly translated

into state policy.

Yet

we know

if

more than

the

anything about public policymaking

sum of

some group

pressures from

it is

that public policy

is

or groups in a given jurisdiction.

Peter Hall has persuasively argued that political pressures are mediated by "an organizational

dynamic

that imprints its

own image on

the

outcomes

.

of individual contributors into a

tions that aggregate the opinions

have their own effects on policy outputs." 9

It is

.

.

set

[and] institu-

of policies

.

.

.

precisely these institutions and

organizational dynamics, of course, that are completely absent from analyses based

on relationships between aggregate data and policy outcomes. To understand welfare

reform

in

New

England, therefore,

ships to the institutions and

We

dynamics

we need

to

move beyond

that imprint their

aggregate relation-

images on policy outcomes.

suggest that an examination of the development of welfare policy in the

England

states reveals patterns

waiting to be explained,

New

patterns that are missed

when treating policy as nothing more than the reflections of overall political forces.
The assumptions of existing theories simply do not reflect the realities of the formulation and implementation of welfare policy in New England.

Institutions

and Dynamics

For those concerned over the presumptive dominance of business interests in
policymaking,

it

will doubtless

come

has been largely absent from deliberations over welfare reform in

Administrative officials in

state

as a surprise to learn that the voice of business

New

England.

the states report that they have not been lobbied by

all

business interests seeking to influence either welfare policy or

its

implementation.

Agency of Human Services notes, "We have not really
been contacted by businesses
the business community has not applied much
pressure." In Maine, members of that state's advisory group have argued that
As

a

member

of Vermont's

.

.

.
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"business groups are not
tance to

Needy

at all

Families." In

involved with negotiations over Temporary Assis-

New

Hampshire, where business groups historically

have been strong, the role of these groups has been minimal. According

Hampshire

lobbyist, "Business groups are not important

are there, but

not clear

it's

how

they

fit

.

.

.

own

Connecticut and Massachusetts contrasted their

lack of access to the John G.

they

Rowland and William

F.

economic

that

TANF

groups have not been major players in the formulation of waivers and
in

know

in."

Even welfare advocates, themselves wary of business power, agree

Advocacy groups

New

to a

Policymakers

plans.

relative

Weld administrations with

the

close relationships business organizations appeared to have with officials of those

governments. Nevertheless, both
groups did not seek

state officials

to influence the process.

and lobbyists noted that business

According

to

one member of

Connecticut's Department of Social Services, "Business was not very involved in
negotiations." Welfare advocates in Massachusetts also agreed that,

influence from business

came

in the

form of more general pressure

anything,

if

keep the

to

state

fiscally strong.

Business did play a

was not

Rhode

critical role in

shaping welfare reform in Rhode Island, but

Island Public Expenditure Council (RIPEC), a business-financed watchdog

group, joined with the Campaign to Eliminate Childhood Poverty and other
nity groups to explore the options available for reforming welfare in

This early study group later became a coalition that developed

reform

fare

plan.

it

the role uninformed observers might have predicted. Early in 1995, the

One

that ultimately

became

the basis for both the

new

its

state

Rhode

own

commuIsland.

plan for wel-

TANF

law and the

of the major objectives of this coalition plan, however, was to prevent a 15

percent reduction in welfare benefits that was proposed by Republican Governor

Lincoln Almond. Led by RIPEC, the coalition was successful

in

fending off the pro-

posed reduction and, in agreement with Governor Almond, was also successful in
expanding medical care and creating a new child care entitlement for the state's
welfare population.

Having played a major role

in

policymaking, however,

RIPEC

has since taken no part in ongoing efforts to implement the new legislation. As

RIPEC's executive director said later, "Once we got the legislation passed, I didn't
feel it was our place to be looking over their shoulders in the implementation process."

The general

lack of business participation in shaping state welfare policy in

New

England, coupled with one business organization's support for higher rather than

lower benefits, suggest the fallibility of untested assumptions about business behavior. Although business control over state welfare policies is often alleged, it remains
unclear

why

business should even be interested in welfare. Business and welfare

client populations
is

seldom overlap by much, the amount of money spent on welfare

small relative to other items in state budgets, and other issues such as overall tax

climate are far more salient than welfare to most business leaders. Even

ness does

become

involved, the

need not uniformly oppose

RIPEC example makes

liberal welfare provisions.

when

busi-

clear that business groups

Business groups differ in

size,

they differ in structure, they differ in purpose, and they differ in quality of leadership.

Whether or not business

is

engaged, and to what ends, must therefore be a

matter of investigation, not assumption.
In addition to the general absence of business participation in shaping state welfare policies, there

is

one other

common

element

72

that has characterized

reform pro-

cesses in the

New

England

demonstrated by the governors and

states: the leadership

their senior welfare administrators. In each of the states except

who

the governors

Rhode

Island,

been primarily responsible for implementation. Even

in

Rhode

it

where

Island,

was

who have

reform proposals and senior administrators

initiated

the

governor's plan was in competition with an alternative plan that had been intro-

duced

many of

earlier,

the governor's proposals

were incorporated

in the

compro-

was eventually passed unanimously by the legislature. The governor had competition in Rhode Island, but he remained a major player and a major
mise proposal

that

new legislation.
new law has been entirely in

influence on the

It is

the

the hands of the governor's senior staff in the De-

partment of

None of

On

tant.

Human

Services.

should be taken to

this

also important to note that implementation of

mean

that state legislatures

have been unimpor-

the contrary, on several occasions in several states, legislatures blocked

welfare reform
sions, as in

Health and

bills

proposed by governors, forcing changes

Maine, the legislature approved a

Human

legislators in

each

bill

Services to put together a waiver request.
state also

over policy choices and,

have participated actively

later, in

groups created

in

On

them.

to

in

A

number of

small

groups that deliberated

monitor implementation.

whole, however, legislatures have been reactive, taking action largely
proposals put forward by governors.

It is

other occa-

authorizing the Department of

the governors

who have

in

led the

On

the

response to

way

in

offering proposals, thus defining the terms over which political debates would occur.

The

Significance of State Administration

Perhaps the most important characteristic of welfare decision making in the

England

however,

states,

is

administrators. In each state, senior administrators helped to shape
policies,

New

the comprehensive and powerful role played by state

new

welfare

and once new policies had been determined, they assumed principal

Agency

sponsibility for implementing those policies.

officials

re-

used their consider-

able discretion in turning policy into action in different ways, notably in the degree
to

which they provided access

to influence decisions.

were more
true,

liberal;

where

independent of the

it

was

advocacy and community groups seeking

for welfare

Where such

access was provided, implementation decisions

not, decisions

were more

restrictive.

This was always

state's political or fiscal condition.

In the four states with the

most generous

policies, senior administrators acted

imaginatively by creating Welfare Reform Advisory Groups

(WRAGs)

consisting

primarily of pro-welfare organizations. These groups were organized in states with
various political environments. States with Democratic, Republican, and Indepen-

dent governors had advisory groups, as did states with divided and unified control

Vermont, Maine, and Rhode Island, administrative

in the legislature. In

formed

WRAGs

prior to the formulation of

Temporary Assistance

to

officials

Needy Families

plans and continue to meet with these groups over implementation issues. In

Hampshire, a

WRAG

submitted the

TANF

were quite
vices

common

was formally established

WRAG

at

department

New

officials

had

plan, although informal meetings between officials and groups

before this time. In Connecticut, the Department of Social Ser-

employed a statewide council

formal

later, after

to solicit input, but officials did not

any point. Unlike the other
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states,

convene a

Massachusetts did not make any
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arrangements for

WRAGs

and took the unprecedented step of suspending the forty-

comment period on TANF provisions.
Advocates in Rhode Island, Vermont, Maine, and New Hampshire

five-day

officials

have been receptive

preferences.

One member of Maine's

of working between

A

WRAG

member of Rhode

achieved "a good law, a

.

.

.

WRAG

Island's

noted that the

had

state

but expressed concern that elected officials would

fair law,"

undermine the terms of reform agreed upon by the Department of

One New Hampshire

and advocate groups.

believe that

all

that policies reflected their

commented that "there was a great deal
The department saw great value

and groups

state [officials]

in engaging groups."

and

to their suggestions

WRAG

ence for working with agencies and not elected

member voiced

officials,

Human

Services

a similar prefer-

arguing that

"we

are far

more comfortable dealing with [administrative] folks. State agencies are long-termers ..
As open as [deliberations] are now, more advocates are invited to the table."
.

Another member of that group argued that the deliberations with the department

were the most effective way

more

New

In fact, the bulk of

Human

Health and

communicate preferences, since agency

to

friendly than legislators

officials "are

— some of these people have human service

training."

Hampshire's plan was actually written by the director of

who

Services,

is

a former

member

of a prominent low-income

advocacy group.
Administrative officials in these states similarly affirm the value of group input.

As

the director of the

of credence

A member

Rhode

Island Department of

given to advocacy groups

is

.

.

Human

of Vermont's Agency of

We

.

more supportive stance than
In Massachusetts

if it

WRAG

Services remarked, "A lot

what they have

to say."

Services agreed that "the contributions of

advocacy groups have made a big difference
adding that the coordination of the

Human

listen a lot to

shaping welfare policy in this

in

with the agency

"moved Vermont

state,"

into a

had just gone with the terms of the federal plan."

and Connecticut, on the other hand, agencies and advocates

were largely adversaries rather than

allies. Officials in

these

two

states

provided the

fewest opportunities for welfare supporters to contest policy decisions, and bargaining opportunities did not exist as they did in the states that produced

more generous

provisions. Both Connecticut and Massachusetts officials typically relied on formal

channels of influence such as legislative hearings to solicit information. Not surprisingly, advocates in these states

more

closely with

them

were frustrated by the refusal of

to develop policy.

One

officials to

work

Connecticut lobbyist characterized

Department of Social Services as an adversary, adding that "the contributions of
advocacy groups are not taken as significant." Even a senior official of the departthe

ment admitted

that pro-welfare

groups "did not have ready access

to the depart-

ment." Massachusetts advocates were also concerned about their declining influence

on

state officials.

"members of

One group

leader said that, in contrast to previous administrations,

now

unfriendly
The types of people in charge
These kinds of comments, typical in Massachusetts and Connecticut, were a far cry from the relatively warm characterizations of
administrative officials expressed by advocates in the other New England states.
Whether they supported liberal or restrictive welfare policies, then, administra-

now

state

agencies are

.

.

.

are not public service types."

New

England

states were critical actors in defining state policies and in
implement them. This should not be surprising, given the literature
on public bureaucracies, which has repeatedly shown that administrators typically

tors in the

deciding

how

to

formulate plans, mobilize constituencies, provide access to favored groups, and
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advocate for policies that can benefit them and the populations they serve. 10
surprising

the

many

is

What

is

the relative lack of attention paid to the role of state administrators in

speculative discussions about the consequences of welfare devolution.

Focusing attention on administrative actions allows us not only to develop a better
understanding of the sources of policy variety but also to observe emerging patterns

may have

of policymaking that

lasting significance.

WRAG, probably the most innovative
England advisory groups. Technically called
the Implementation Subcommittee of the Task Force on Federal Legislation of the
state Children's Cabinet, this group was initiated by Christine Ferguson, director of
Consider, for example, the

and most

fully

developed of the

the Department of

Membership

is

Rhode

Human

essentially

Island

New

community groups.

Services, at the request of several

open-ended and includes any community group, advo-

cacy group, and service provider organization that chooses to attend, as well as
senior administrators from the department and any other interested parties, such as
lobbyists or former legislators.

The open-ended nature of membership means that
more than sev-

the semiweekly meetings can be very large, sometimes attended by

enty persons, depending on the topics under discussion.

It is

imagine a

difficult to

more effective vehicle for generating the broadest possible range of opinions from
community organizations, including those which had successfully opposed the reform plan developed by the department and put forward by the governor.
In a

memorandum

creating the subcommittee, the

Department of

Human

Services

(DHS) gives it extraordinarily broad responsibilities: "The committee
can serve
as a community sounding board and planning body to assist DHS as it implements
the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Act (PRA) and the state
Family Independence Act. // would also address broader children and family issues.
As needed, smaller work groups would break off to do more intensive, time-sensitive work on specific issues" (italics added). The subcommittee began meeting in the
fall of 1996 and has been meeting every other week for two hours ever since. DHS
.

.

.

senior staff attend every meeting and provide information and staff assistance to the

subcommittee and the several task forces
keeping with

its

from intake procedures and
lence.

the

It

it

has created to address separate issues. In

mandate, the subcommittee has addressed a broad range of issues
client

assessment to substance abuse and domestic vio-

has also prepared a detailed set of recommendations following

new program design being implemented by DHS. Most

recently

it

its

review of

has been

re-

viewing the plan developed by the Department of Labor and Training, in conjunc-

DHS, to administer the new Welfare to Work funds.
As this brief review suggests, Rhode Island's new Implementation Subcommittee
has become a forum for an ongoing public dialogue between DHS and the state's
welfare community over many policy issues, large and small. After three years of
tion with

meetings, regular participants are on a first-name basis, a degree of trust has re-

placed mutual suspicion, and both

DHS

and subcommittee members agree

that the

subcommittee's work has been helpful in shaping policy. The subcommittee
ther an administrative

both. Fundamentally

arm of

it is

DHS

is nei-

nor a coalition of community groups but a

a forum in which

directly into the decision-making process

community representatives

and senior

DHS

administrators get

diate feedback, positive and negative, about their decisions,

little

of

are brought

imme-

even as they are making

them. Although administrators sometimes are uncomfortable with the immediacy of
criticism,

and while group representatives sometimes
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feel

uneasy over straddling the
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between influence and co-option, both sides continue

the complexities of reforming welfare. For the

moment

work energetically on
new instrumentality

to

this

appears to be working. Whether it will ultimately be abandoned
ment or modified or made permanent remains to be seen.

as a failed experi-

Conclusions
Welfare reform

in

New

England has confounded those who have based

their expec-

on unexamined assumptions about the structure and dynamics of federalrelations. Within this region, at least, there is no evidence of any race to the

tations
state

bottom, with states competing against one another to achieve the lowest benefit

Business groups have not led such a race; indeed, business groups have had

levels.
little

or nothing to say about reforming welfare.

tures

engaged

lative

in

Nor have governors

or state legisla-

such a race. Furthermore, neither gubernatorial proposals nor legis-

responses have been based on the actions of neighboring

own

have crafted their

policies to deal with their

own

states. Instead, states

welfare problems, which ac-

counts for the variety in those programs. The results are that three states have enacted reforms that rank

among

most generous

the

in the nation, another state has

enacted reforms that are average in generosity, and two states have enacted less

generous policies; Massachusetts, whose reforms are the most restrictive
tion, is

in the na-

one of the two.

Conventional analysis that attempts to associate various indicators of

political or

economic conditions with policy is of little help in understanding these outcomes.
Conventional analysis pays little attention to the institutional systems through which
policies are developed and thus misses the most important source of welfare policies
in New England: the actions of state administrators. Four states have relatively liberal policies

nity

because administrators in those states sought out members of commu-

and advocacy groups, listened

to them, crafted policies

based on what they

heard, and invited such groups to help implement the policies.
relatively restrictive policies

governors, kept

community and advocacy groups

attention to their

policies will

recommendations.

work

ents into jobs, but

better than the

we can

Two

states enacted

because administrators, following the lead of

We

more

at

arm's length and paid

cannot yet say whether the more
restrictive policies to

at least appreciate

how

move

those policies

their
little

liberal

welfare recipi-

came

into existence.

Administration matters.

We

note in closing that the

New

England experience challenges the analytically

popular notion that welfare constituencies and the groups that represent them lack
the ability to contest state policies effectively. In four

New

England

states, after all,

welfare advocacy groups were able to exert considerable influence, largely because
of the actions of state officials. Institutional contexts, in short, determine the groups
that will or will not

Because

succeed in being influential, and thus which policies are enacted.

state capitals are often small in size,

with large numbers of advocacy

groups that have relatively easy access to both legislators and administrators, such
groups may in fact have greater opportunities for influence in states than they have
in

Washington, where arguments are often drowned out by expensive media cam-

paigns.

As Howard Leichter has

pete with various citizen groups

argued, "In the states, special interests must com.

.

.

[This] represents an important strategic

provement over the role [low-income] groups now play
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im-

in the national arena."

11

Analyses thai ignore state institutional settings, and the actions of administrators
within such settings, will continue to miss

form welfare.

much

that

is critical

to

our efforts to

re-
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